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All Nation-States are born and found themselves in violence. I believe that truth to 
be irrecusable. Without even exhibiting atrocious spectacles on this subject, it 
suffices to underline a law of structure: the moment of foundation, the instituting 
moment, is anterior to the law or legitimacy which it founds. It is thus outside the 
law, and violent by that very fact.... This foundational violence is not only forgotten. 
The foundation is made in order to hide it; by its essence it tends to organise 
amnesia, something under the celebration and sublimation of the grand 
beginnings. 
Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness2 
 
Abstract 
Before the build-up to the centenary of the 1915 invasion of Turkey’s Gallipoli Peninsula be-
gins in earnest, I thought it might be timely to interrogate the notion that those of us who live 
in Australasia are confronted with every Anzac Day: that it was on April 25, 1915, the day the 
Australia New Zealand Army Corps (Anzacs) landed at Gallipoli as part of the Mediterranean 
Expeditionary Force, that the consciousness of nationhood was born in Australia and New Zea-
land, This foundational idea, with specific application to Australia, was first published nine 
years after the event by Charles Bean, the Australian Government’s official World War I his-
torian who is also regarded as having created the Anzac legend. On a broader view, World War 
I was, for Bean, about freedom, and more broadly still, about the survival of civilisation.  
 
 
These often highly conflicted truth-claims are all part and parcel of the legitimising grand nar-
ratives deployed by settler societies, the teleologies of which are always already oriented to-
wards the realisation of their civilising projects and the fulfilment of their idealised selves in 
‘the not-yet-now’. These narratives are not only self-authorising but are also able to negate 
competing indigenous narratives by dint of presenting themselves as superior by virtue of the 
progress they denote. However, just as ‘the not-yet-now’ cannot arrive and still be the future, 
so the goals of these narratives cannot be realized and still remain the focus of the collective 
progress to come. It is for these reasons that these goals are kept alive in the future anterior of 
their narratives and regularly updated. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, as this article 
has tried to show, an important part of that process is the annual re-staging of the quasi-religious 
spectacle of Anzac Day with its sacralization of the noble values ‘discovered’ in the carnage 
of Gallipoli and elevated in the national consciousness to the point where they effectively oc-
clude, on the one hand, ‘the criminality of the act of foundation of what became known as 
“Australia”’, and, on the other, the brutality and betrayal by which an archipelago, called New 
Zealand by Europeans, was also taken over by the British. While this combined expropriation 
of around eight million square kilometres might seem of monumental proportions, it pales into 
insignificance, or so the Anzac legend would have us believe, compared with fighting and dy-
ing for freedom and saving civilisation itself. Such is the thin but glistening thread of exculpa-
tory memory to which settlerism clings. 
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With the centenary of the 1915 invasion of Turkey’s Gallipoli Peninsula fast approaching, it is 
timely to interrogate the notion that those of us who live in New Zealand are confronted with 
every Anzac Day: that it was on April 25, 1915, the day the Australia New Zealand Army Corps 
(Anzacs) landed at Gallipoli as part of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, that the 
consciousness of nationhood was born in Australia and New Zealand.3 This foundational idea, 
with specific application to Australia, was first published nine years after the event by Charles 
Bean, the Australian Government’s official World War I historian who is also regarded as 
having created the Anzac legend. On a broader view, World War I was, for Bean, about freedom, 
and more broadly still, about the survival of civilisation. As he wrote in “The Anzac Legacy,” 
the chapter concluding his abridged version of the Great War published in 1946: “If the cause 
that led Australians to enlist can be reduced to a single principle, it is the principle of protecting 
their homes and their freedom by sustaining a system of law and order between nations.”4 This, 
Bean believed, was one of the “fundamental” “lessons of history,” in that: 
only in conditions ensuring freedom of thought and communication can mankind 
progress; and that such freedom can be maintained only by the qualities by which 
from Grecian times it has been won—by such qualities as our own people managed 
to preserve through the first 126 peaceful years of their existence—the readiness at 
any time to die for freedom, if necessary, and the virility to struggle for it. In facing 
that necessity we now share with the New Zealanders one condition that was 
lacking to our young nations in 1915: we have passed through the test which until 
now, unfortunately, has necessarily been judged by mankind as the supreme one 
for men fit to be free; and we have emerged from that test with the Anzac tradition.5 
 
 Since its invention, Bean’s Anzac tradition has been foundational to the collective 
memory of all of us who have no memory of this landmark event, and is widely appropriated 
for purposes of promoting national exceptionalism whenever the Gallipoli story is told from an 
Australasian perspective. For instance, on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the Gallipoli 
landings, New Zealand journalist Tim Watkin wrote that “increasingly, young Kiwis are 
coming to see Gallipoli as the defining moment in New Zealand’s struggle for national 
identity,” and that “most New Zealanders see Gallipoli as a place where our nationhood was 
forged in the heat of battle.”6 In his article, Watkin quoted three secondary school students—
winners of the Government’s Anzac Day essay competition whose prize was to accompany the 
then New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, to Gallipoli for that anniversary—all of whom 
believed that Gallipoli was central to New Zealand’s sense of self. “Young New Zealanders” 
go to Gallipoli “in their thousands,” added The New Zealand Herald’s long-time columnist 
Garth George about the 90th anniversary, because “[t]hey want to connect with their nation’s 
history, some with their family history too. They are not taken in by the milk-sop pacifism 
preached in their schoolrooms and lecture halls, or by the politically correct gaps in the 
laundered history they have been taught. They want to know where they come from because 
that helps them know where they are going.”7 
  For settler Australasians, Gallipoli, in Pierre Nora’s terminology, constitutes a lieu 
de mémoire (site of memory).8 According to Nora, these sites “only exist because of their 
capacity for metamorphosis, an endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable 
proliferation of their ramifications.”9 It is les lieux de mémoire that historians colonise and 
where they incessantly overwrite the palimpsest of memory according to their own 
preoccupations, prescriptions and pre-selections.10 
 
Before I begin my interrogation proper, I would like to discuss what I take history to be in the 
hope that we might better understand why Charles Bean’s interpretation of this catastrophic 
event, although not uncontested, remains the dominant view.11 
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  History is a self-referential discourse that presents itself in narrative form and 
originates its meaning in relation to an object, the past, which it purports to represent and 
explain. It rises out of the lack of coincidence between an event and our understanding of that 
event, which in turn is a consequence of the event’s inability to be present to itself. Hence, all 
historical meaning is created retroactively in the face of what is known and/or believed, and 
with a not uncommon result: “the confusion of consecution and consequence, what comes after 
being read in narrative as what is caused by,” or more prosaically, with effect being taken as 
the origin of the cause.12 A further significant issue arises when those writing the past fail to 
distinguish between notional and tangible referents, thereby leaving unchallenged the 
commonly held but mistaken belief that the past is an accessible site sitting somewhere beyond 
the discourse. While Eelco Runia takes the view that the past is an “ontological twilight state,” 
concluding that “[w]e historians are inclined to combine a half-hearted belief that the past exists 
with an equally half-hearted belief that the past does not exist—and so we can be said to be 
doubly wrong,” Keith Jenkins argues the case more forcibly: 
we recognise today that there never has been, and that there never will be, any such 
thing as a past which is expressive of some sort of essence. . . . Consequently, the 
whole “modernist” History/history ensemble now appears as a self-referential, 
problematic expression of “interests,” an ideological–interpretive discourse 
without any “real” access to the past as such, unable to engage in any dialogue with 
“reality.” In fact, “history” now appears to be just one more “expression” in a world 
of postmodern expressions: which of course is what it is.13 
 
 Furthermore, because history situates itself between an event and our cognition of that 
event, it must rely for its authority on “a sort of fabulous retroactivity.” 14  This self-
authorisation—the confirming of a priori meaning created a posteriori—“is a movement of 
the future anterior,” which is the trace of the irreducibility of the “now” or present, and is itself 
apparent in the lack of coincidence between res gestae and historia rerum gestarum, what 
happened and the account of what happened, even when both are taken to be discursive 
productions.15 
However, despite these philosophical and methodological issues, neither History as 
orthodoxy nor the wider discourse of history can or should be read as myth or fiction, although 
either or both might enter the discourse during the incessant re-writing process. For as we know 
it today, history is peculiarly and particularly of itself, a nineteenth-century European invention 
that functions as “a perspective apparatus, a form of realism, a temporal counterpart of pictorial 
realism,” the product of which, historiography, endeavours to present a comprehensible past 
and provide rational explanations for past actions.16 Yet in performing this function, history 
must disguise its paradoxical ontology, its impossible possibility, which it accomplishes 
through the general deployment of metaphor and by believing that “it knows only a two-term 
semantic schema, signifier and referent.”17 Peter Hoffer explains the former: 
History is impossible. Nothing I have written or could write will change that brute 
fact. We cannot go back in time. But doing history, studying the past, is not 
impossible. . . . There is a striking scene near the end of the movie Indiana Jones 
and the Last Crusade in which Indiana Jones must cross a yawning chasm to reach 
the cave that houses the Holy Grail. He must have faith in his quest, and that faith 
requires he take a step into what appears to be empty space. He does, and finds 
solid ground—a bridge to the other side. What we need to complete our philosophy 
is a step of faith onto the bridge we have constructed.18 
 
 In regard to the latter, history must suppose what Roland Barthes describes as “a 
double operation” in order to portray absence as presence and thereby disguise the 
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propositional or belief-based nature of its meaning and existence. 19 In its first phase, this 
“extremely complex” operation sees the referent (the past, more broadly, an event, more 
narrowly) detached from the discourse thereby giving the appearance that it controls the 
discourse; the second phase sees the merging of signifier and referent to the exclusion of the 
signified thereby creating what Barthes calls “the referential illusion” or “reality effect” (effet 
de réel). 20  As a result, historical discourse may be instructively described as “a fake 
performative discourse in which the apparent constative (descriptive) is in fact only the 
signifier of the speech-act as an act of authority. In other words, in ‘objective’ history, the ‘real’ 
is never anything but an unformulated signified, sheltered behind the apparent omnipotence of 
the referent.”21 Furthermore, because any “conceptual formation to be analysed” is necessarily 
delimited and in essence pre-predicative—“it has the form it will be revealed to have in advance 
of its exposure to view”—historical meaning will always already conform to the teleology of 
the narrative in which it is embedded while appearing to pre-exist the “reportage” of the event 
to which it is attached, as well as giving the (false) impression that it exists independently of 
the narrative.22 
      Thus, while we can say, after Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, that history “is achieved not 
found,” its “methodological accomplishments,” on Ermarth’s view, “are worthy of the 
reverence we pay them, so long as we remember that they are based on acts of faith.”23 They 
are so, not least, because “[h]istorical time is a fundamentally religious construction,” a matter 
of great import that writers of the past tend to ignore.24 Even the time series, past-present-
future, that modernity invented in order to situate events, establish causality and both imagine 
and manage historical continuity against a limitless horizon, is, as John McTaggart explains, a 
contradiction of “incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no 
event can be more than one. This is essential to the meaning of the terms.”25 Yet if time involves 
change, as historians concur when they speak of change over time, “the only change we can 
get is from future to present, and from present to past.”26 But if an event “is past, it has been 
present and future,” and “[i]f it is future, it will be present and past,” and “[i]f it is present, it 
has been future and will be past,” in the result that “all the three incompatible terms are 
predicable of each event, which is obviously inconsistent with their being incompatible, and 
inconsistent with their producing change.”27 
 Finally, we should note that in the very act of remembering history also forgets. That 
is, because history is essentially discursive and therefore selective, based as it is on “a relentless 
making of choices,” it “organises amnesia” even as it ascribes and re-ascribes meaning to “the 
no-longer now.”28 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that history was the ideal cultural instrument with which 
to underwrite the transition from sacred to secular political power systems in nineteenth-
century Europe and the reason why it functions today, in religion’s stead, as arguably “the 
metanarrative in Western discourse” in which the political order of nation-states is mandated 
and updated and “the presumed superiority of modern, industrial society” in relation to other 
civilisations and cultures is “retroactively substantiated.”29 It performs the selfsame function 
for all settlers societies, including the one we are most concerned with here, New Zealand, 
where “the white dream of a new country . . . requires that indigenous inhabitants be forgotten 
or constructed in terms of the vision of a bright future,” one in which all inhabitants are 
considered to be more or less indigenous.30 This is apparent in Michael King’s truth-claim that 
“Pakeha New Zealanders who are committed to this land and its people are no less ‘indigenous’ 
than Maori”, and in James Belich’s use of “decolonisation” to describe changes in “1970’s-
90s” New Zealand, when, as Peter Gibbons points out, “the term ‘decolonization’ . . . is usually 
deployed to characterize a rather more significant transfer of power from imperial authorities 
to local peoples, especially in Africa and Asia, than has taken place in New Zealand.”31 
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Before examining those cultural mechanisms by which “Gallipoli” is transformed into a 
transcendental signifier/signified that stands for the simultaneous birth of two settler nation-
states, we should also consider the mechanics of language that make possible the euphoria of 
remembrance that accompanies every Anzac Day, or, as Jean-François Lyotard has it, “the 
dementia of enthusiasm” commonly associated with justificatory or exculpatory discourse.32 
 First, we should take into account Ferdinand de Saussure’s counter-intuitive 
proposition that “in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms.”33 That is, 
words have no positive meaning in and of themselves and only attain to such through the 
differential functioning of language, following which they are stored in dictionaries and 
modified and preserved in our common usage. Put otherwise, words do not acquire meaning 
directly from the objects or ideas they signify; rather, they acquire meaning by a process of 
negative differentiation that establishes what they are not. Thus a dog is a not-god. As Course 
in General Linguistics explains: “There is no internal connexion, for example, between the idea 
“sister” and the French sequence of sounds s-ö-r which acts as its signal. The same idea might 
as well be represented by any other sequence of sounds. This is demonstrated by differences 
between languages, and even by the existence of different languages.”34 Ermarth elaborates: 
“To understand anything means to understand its function in a differential system of meaning 
and value, in other words, in terms of a code. Within that code the more we know about what 
something is not, the more we can understand how it functions and thus what it ‘means.’ 
Linguistic value arises not positively but negatively from a complex, largely subliminal system 
of differentiations.”35 
 Hence Saussure’s interpretation of linguistics not only overturns the West’s traditional 
understanding that words are positive entities comprised of meaning derived from their 
referents, but also proposes more broadly that “[d]iscursive systems are the condition of 
consciousness and knowledge.”36 
 Second, we should be mindful in our construction of the other of the significance of 
binary oppositions, in which one of the pairing is always dominant or privileged. For instance, 
without the idea of the civilised, believed, ironically, to succeed the savage chronologically, the 
savage could not be thought. That is, these two signifiers reference ideas, not tangible objects, 
and make sense only in relation to each other. Hence, the predicational basis of both savage 
and civilised does not preexist their binary relationship; each needs the other to be understood 
as itself, and thus each constitutes the other, gives the other “life” by way of differential 
negation. The same may be said of all binary oppositions—love/hate, good/evil, true/false, 
right/left, hot/cold, remembering/forgetting, and so on—the opposite existing as the trace or 
shadow of the word of which it is the reciprocating other. Even a transcendental signifier such 
as “Gallipoli,” which sits as a function, not a geographical locus, at the (non-)centre of its own 
signifying system controlling that system’s domain and play, “is never absolutely present 
outside a system of differences.”37 As such, it is dependent on the differential system for its 
“metaphysical reduction” to the point where it appears to transcend language and become 
untouchable and irreducible in its meaning.38 
 The principle of differential negation also applies to identity formation, both 
individual and collective: concepts of national identity, for instance, are predicated on what 
“we” are that “others” are not. Likewise, settler societies construct themselves in opposition to 
their binary other, the indigenous societies they supplant.39 This process is further complicated 
by our language systems allowing meaning and value to be added to inexistent objects as if 
they were extant but without the corresponding requirement that such a distinction be made. 
 As a consequence, historians (and others), after Charles Bean, are able to make all 
manner of pronouncements about Gallipoli as if the meaning behind those pronouncements 
were extracted from the Gallipoli slopes themselves. Unsurprisingly, because these truth-
claims serve a political agenda, they can sometimes make little or no rational sense but take on 
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the appearance of rationality within the rationalising function of the narrativizing process, 
contributing as they do so to a phallogocentric discourse that they themselves have helped to 
construct. For instance, according to Keith Sinclair, “W. P. Morrell, who in 1935 first 
interpreted the history of New Zealand as the growth of a nation, concluded that New Zealand 
announced its manhood to the world on the bloody slopes of Gallipoli in 1915.”40 Sinclair 
himself believed that “[a]fter the war there was a very general agreement among the New 
Zealanders that they were a new nation.” 41 In citing John Masefield’s description of “the 
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps and the Royal Naval Division”—“They were . . . the 
finest body of young men ever brought together in modern times. For physical beauty and 
nobility of bearing they surpassed any men I have ever seen; they walked and looked like the 
kings in old poems, and reminded me of the line in Shakespeare: ‘Baited like eagles having 
lately bathed’”—Sinclair also suggested that “the high praise the troops received abroad 
boosted national pride.”42 
 Christopher Pugsley’s backwards causality performs the same function similarly, not 
only contributing to the masculinist values that underwrite the discourse but also proposing 
that those values are foundational to the settler nation-state, Pugsley’s unproblematised “we” 
that serves as the discourse’s compact but unlocatable referent:  
Gallipoli was a major step in our recognition of ourselves as New Zealanders. It is 
a process that continues today. . . . Every man who served on Gallipoli endured, 
and established a reputation and a sense of identity that is important to us today. 
Through it we can establish who we are. . . . Our society today has been moulded 
by the Gallipoli experience. This was when we began to think for ourselves and for 
the first time to put New Zealand’s interests first. We are the sum of what our 
soldiers did, what they found, and what they lost. It was the loss of innocence.43 
 
 The New Zealand Government’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage’s Anzac Day 
website makes a similar claim, likewise in keeping with Bean’s Anzac tradition: “After 
Gallipoli, New Zealand had a greater confidence in its distinct identity, and a greater pride in 
the international contribution it could make. And the mutual respect earned during the fighting 
formed the basis of the close ties with Australia that continue today.”44 As the site concludes: 
“Today, at a time when it seems New Zealanders are increasingly keen to assert and celebrate 
a unique identity, we recognise Anzac Day as a central marker of our nationhood.”45 
 Chris Maclean and Jock Phillips also rely on predication to promote homosociality as 
the basis of national identity in their government-sponsored The Sorrow & the Pride: “During 
the war itself many New Zealanders came to believe that the performance of the soldiers on 
foreign fields had established the country’s ‘manhood’ in the eyes of the world. The war was 
considered the birth of national identity. At welcome-home receptions, and in Anzac Day 
speeches, the Kiwi soldier was praised for his physique, his courage, his ingenuity – and the 
plaudits of foreign observers were endlessly rehearsed.”46 
 After stating that “[t]he cost to New Zealand was 2721 dead and 4752 wounded out 
of a total of 8450 men – a staggering 88 per cent casualty rate,” Michael King notes that in 
Australia and New Zealand “[t]he necessary myth evolved quickly in both countries that they 
had ‘come of age’ on the slopes of Gallipoli. Fred Waite, official historian of the New Zealand 
contribution, put it this way: ‘[Before] the war we were an untried and insular people; after 
ANZAC, we were tried and trusted.’”47 
 Philippa Mein Smith, who endeavours in her national general history “to unravel the 
way in which key moments and episodes in New Zealand history contribute to the country’s 
national myths,” writes that “Gallipoli became the defining moment for both New Zealand and 
Australia in 1915 because Gallipoli was the site where their representatives of the ‘coming 
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man’ were subjected to their first – global – test and proved their manhood. The Anzacs 
represented the highest form of citizenship: soldiers who passed the test of war.”48 
 Russell Ward ascribes a similar significance to Anzac Day for Australians: “Since the 
slaughter at Gallipoli the anniversary of the Landing has become not only a day of Australian 
mourning and remembrance for the war dead, but also the Australian national day above all 
others.”49 
 In 2008, on Anzac Day, Australia’s then Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, harnessed 
Bean’s Anzac tradition to eulogize his fellow citizens by claiming: 
That we are a good people who want for the good of others. That we stand for a 
deep sense of liberty for which our forebears fought and which should never be 
surrendered – whatever the cost. That we are a people who by instinct cannot stand 
idly by and be indifferent to the suffering of others. A people with a sense of a fair 
go for all carved deep into our national soul. A people also alert to the needs of our 
friends and allies. These are the values which summoned forth the sons and 
daughters of ANZAC over the last 100 years from our smallest towns, our greatest 
cities and our most remote outback. It is this, I believe, that touches us afresh each 
ANZAC morning – the fresh voices of those who have indeed not grown old 
because their voices still whisper to us amid the quiet reflections of this sombre 
day . . . [c]ausing us to remember afresh . . . that . . . freedom is always purchased 
by sacrifice. Lest we forget.50 
 
What, then, apart from the apparently inexhaustible rhetoric, are the linguistic and cultural 
devices and strategies that enable the violence and slaughter of this large-scale military 
misadventure to be transformed into “a central marker” of nationhood for Australia and New 
Zealand?51 
 First, in order to become the icon of Australasian settlerism, “Gallipoli” required a 
radicalized theology with a verifiable backstory of epic proportions—that is, it needed to be 
repackaged as a new kind of narrative in which the sacred and the secular co-existed. This 
meant a melding of two great traditions: Christianity and empiricism. Hence, we find the 
empirical history of the Gallipoli campaign, along with all its grim accoutrements, adorned 
with quasi-religious symbolism, the apogee of which is its own religious relic: the remains of 
an unidentified combatant, the Unknown Soldier, enshrined within a tomb. Conjoined, the 
sacred and secular provide a seemingly unassailable sense of certainty to the improbable idea 
that the national consciousness of Australia and New Zealand was conceived during the 
invasion of a distant foreign land. Indeed, such is the potency of this sacred/secular narrative 
that it has largely seduced two settler populations into believing that it defines and legitimates 
their exceptionalised selves and their civilising destinies. 
 Second, the legend needed staging as a spectacle. This occurs every April 25 th when 
the discourse of Gallipoli is theatricalised through a nation-wide performance of remembrance 
broadcast on radio and television from locations around Australian and New Zealand and 
packaged in patriotic terms by the nation’s leading “actors,” who, in the major urban centres, 
are typically surrounded by a large supporting cast of representatives from the armed forces 
and central and local government. 
 The 25th of April 2009 in New Zealand was exemplary in this regard. That day there 
were three principal actors who took to the national stage as part of this complex choreography: 
the Right Honourable Sir Anand Satyanand, Governor-General of New Zealand, the Right 
Honourable Dame Sian Seerpohi Elias, Administrator of the Government of New Zealand and 
Chief Justice, and the Right Honourable John Phillip Key, Prime Minister of New Zealand.  
 Satyanand travelled to Turkey to attend the Anzac Day Dawn Service at Anzac Cove, 
where, echoing Christopher Pugsley, he told the gathering of 7,500 that “New Zealanders lost 
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their innocence at Gallipoli but from that loss of innocence, and from deep grief at the loss of 
so much life, New Zealanders also came to see their nation as more than just an adjunct to 
Great Britain.”52 Later in the day he delivered his Chunuk Bair Address. “[T]his battle,” he 
said, “has a wider significance for New Zealand and New Zealanders. Like the splitting of the 
atom and the conquering of Mt Everest, the story of Chunuk Bair has become a legendary part 
of what it means to be a New Zealander.”53 Although Satyanand used the referent Chunuk Bair 
to anchor his speech, he was really talking about national exceptionalism and identity and 
notions of cultural difference on which they are based. We know this because two of the notable 
events he referenced—Ernest Rutherford’s splitting of the atom (1917) and Edmund Hillary 
and Tensing Norgay’s ascent of Everest (1953)—occurred after the battle for the Chunuk Bair 
summit in August 1915. While these events have no logical connection to each other outside 
of Satyanand’s speech, their connection appears indissoluble because the speech was made 
while Satyanand was standing on the spot, a literal merging of signifier and referent at the 
moment he ascribed meaning to the nominal designator, Chunuk Bair. Even the sense of his 
statement is dependent not on the existence of the place, Chunuk Bair, but on Chunuk Bair 
having been invested with particular meaning within the Anzac tradition. In other words, 
Satyanand was not extracting meaning from the geographical location Chunuk Bair but 
applying meaning to it from New Zealand’s settler historiography that supports the originary 
fiction of New Zealand’s national birth. Having offered his audience a retroactive fantasy, 
Satyanand then produced his counterfactual moment in which he claimed that “failure to press 
home” the advantage of the winning of Chunuk Bair by the New Zealanders “doomed the 
Gallipoli campaign and led eventually to the evacuation of Allied troops just before Christmas 
1915.”54 But that was not before the New Zealanders, while briefly in possession of Chunuk 
Bair, were purportedly shelled by an Allied warship, for which Satyanand relied on British 
historian Robert Rhodes James quoting Captain Hastings fourteen years after the incident.55 
That was the cue for Satyanand’s “incorporated fiction”: “In his play, ‘Once on Chunuk Bair,’ 
New Zealand playwright Maurice Shadbolt recounted the taking of the summit. He imagined 
the following response by New Zealand’s Colonel to a British general’s enquiry about progress: 
 ‘Tell him some scarecrows called Wellington Infantry have taken Chunuk Bair. No. 
Tell him, God damn it, that New Zealand has taken Chunuk Bair. Tell him New 
Zealand is holding Chunuk Bair.’”56 
 In the National War Memorial in Wellington, Elias gave “the oral history reading”—
part of an interview in 1982 by Shadbolt of Dan Curham, the only survivor of sixteen 
companions who had set out together on the Chunuk Bair offensive: 
By some miracle I was the only one who got anywhere near the summit of Chunuk 
Bair. I never saw or heard of my companions again. I don’t even know what 
happened to their bodies. I didn’t weep physically. I was not a weeping chap. I wept 
in my heart. I have felt their loss very deeply for the rest of my life. Talking about 
Gallipoli, especially about Chunuk Bair, brings sorrow to my heart, even as I talk 
to you now.57 
 
 Elias’s rendition of sacrifice and stoicism was followed by Key’s Anzac Day address, 
which includes the now familiar truth-claim that “both New Zealand and Australia emerged 
with a new sense of certainty about our place in the world” from Gallipoli.58 Key continued: 
Anzac Day unites generations of Kiwis and binds us to our history as a country. 
Today we mark our proud history of sacrifice and heroism, we remember those 
men and women who put their lives on the line for our country, and who fought for 
a better world. . . . Let us celebrate the Anzac spirit we continue to share with our 
Australian neighbours. For we who were brothers in arms are brothers still. Finally 
today let us salute the Anzacs who fought for us . . . to preserve our freedom and 
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humanitarian ideals . . . who rose to heights of sacrifice and, in doing so, preserved 
the living standards of all of us, for generations to come. They fought for each and 
every one of us, they fought for New Zealand, and they fought for our world.59 
 
 While this address may have struck a patriotic chord with many who heard it, it was, 
in effect, a violation of the chronology on which it depends. Those in the Gallipoli campaign 
could not have been fighting for “our” freedom because most of “us” in 2009 were not alive in 
1915; they, the “brothers in arms,” had no concept of “our” living standards, and, more likely 
than not, were having an overseas adventure on the politics of empire, fighting not for their 
country, let alone “our” nonexistent world, but for the British Empire.60 
 We can see, then, a clear correspondence between the actors’ rhetoric and the work of 
the historians and writers on which their speeches are based. Part of a deceased author’s 
research material for his 1982 play was rendered as a “sacred” reading in Wellington’s 
“cathedral of death” on the same day an extract from his play was read at Gallipoli, thereby 
turning absence into presence by collapsing chronological time on which their narratives are 
based: a performance by government “actors” in 2009, an interview from 1982, and a military 
invasion in 1915. Importantly, the extract from Shadbolt’s play was immediately preceded by 
the ostensive phrase, “once on Chunuk Bair,” the “cognitive pretensions” of which were 
realised, as we have seen, by it being read at the geographical locus to which it refers.61 In this 
way the imaginative referent of the phrase and play (“Chunuk Bair”) attains an apparent 
tangibility and its attendant meaning is transformed into an apparent reality cognised through 
Satyanand’s performance. Hence, the meaning attributed to the nominal designator “Chunuk 
Bair” in Wellington was carried to the geographical location Chunuk Bair by the country’s 
nominal head where it was delivered to an expectant audience for whom, in that physical 
setting, it made sense, despite that same nominal designator holding quite different meaning 
for those who actually live nearby. Thus because of the rigidity of the nominal designator, 
which permits the attachment of different meaning in different discourses to its unchanging 
name, and through the conflation of the ostensive and the cognitive in the narrative, the notional 
attained the status of the tangible thereby enabling the transformation of wholesale death into 
the imaginary moment of collective birth. 
 Self-evidently, however, there is nothing real about any of this except for the 
performances themselves, the carefully choreographed spectacle of government 
representatives circulating a nationalistic theology, “designed,” as George Orwell puts it, “to 
make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure 
wind.”62 For while we might set foot on the Gallipoli Peninsula, even stumble across the 
detritus of war—bullets, shrapnel, human remains—we cannot best the Grandfather Paradox 
and travel back in time. Indeed, all that remains visible at Gallipoli are the names of the missing 
and the dead, names that have no meaning, only a function to which can be attached “an 
indefinite number of unpredictable descriptions.”63 Thus, the Anzac legend, with Gallipoli as 
its central motif, remains the principal foundational discourse of Australasian settlerism, a 
totalising fiction that allows the settlers’ world to be placed “under a description which then 
acts as if it were real.”64 Put otherwise, the meaning of Gallipoli is not extracted from the place 
called Gallipoli but is added to it by way of an elaborate rhetorical and metaphorical operation 
that not only retroactively supports the idea of Gallipoli as a sacred site of national nativity but 
also acts as a collective pedagogy offering one of the central names and stories that facilitate 
entry into Australasian settler culture for both the child and the immigrant, through an 
apprenticeship in proper names, heroes, places and dates.65 
 
What, then, might be the reasons for attaching this fabulistic meaning to “Gallipoli” and how 
might we account for its astonishing success as arguably the central sign of Australasian 
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settlerism? While we can only speculate and, like the historian, not escape history’s impossible 
possibility, what we can say from the historiographical making over of settler sites and the way 
linguistic systems function is that all settler societies construct their originary selves in 
opposition to the indigenous societies they displace. That is why the Gallipoli discourse 
performs such a vital double function for the Australasian settler nation-states: it not only acts 
as “the moment of foundation,” the moment of “real” national birth that supersedes the “unreal” 
originary myths and traditions of tāngata whenua but also acts as “the instituting moment” that 
introduces and extols “superior” settler values and related benefits, which in turn legitimate the 
prior settler acts of expropriation.66 Hence the extraordinary investment by Australia and New 
Zealand in the Anzac legend may be considered more or less commensurate with the level of 
violence and deception visited on their indigenous populations and the correlative need to 
forget the associated acts of dispossession and displacement. That is, because these settler 
societies cannot squarely face what they have done, because they cannot square their need to 
belong with the cost of that belonging, they facilitate, in their annual re-staging of this spectacle 
of remembrance, this “instituting moment” that doubles as an exculpatory myth, a spectacular 
forgetting that situates their crimes, at least temporarily, beyond their collective consciences.67 
Remembering is forgetting on Anzac Day. As Ani Mikaere has it in regard to non-indigenous 
New Zealanders: “One barely has to scratch the Pākehā surface to find the guilt lying 
immediately beneath, guilt which manifests itself as denial, self-justification, defensiveness 
and, incredibly enough, a sense of victimhood. . . . The cost to Pākehā . . . is a burden of shame 
that they cannot escape.”68 Across the Tasman, Marilyn Lake considers that Anzac “serve[s] as 
White Australia’s creation myth,” and Martin Ball that it “is a means of forgetting the origins 
of Australia. The Aboriginal population is conveniently absent.” 69  In other words, the 
expropriation of both geographical domains has left an ethical deficit of such monumental 
proportions that it must be exchanged for an equivalent benefit if these settler societies are to 
maintain belief in their legitimacy and their civilising destinies. 
 To elaborate, the Anzac narrative of national nativity both remembers the imperial 
violence of the Gallipoli invasion and forgets the imperial violence used to dispossess the 
Australian and New Zealand indigenous populations of their land, along with the ignoble 
values associated with the brutality, deception, murder, greed, ruthlessness and treachery that 
accompanied those acts of dispossession but for which these societies would rather not be 
known or remembered. In this regard, Anzac Day, as a day of national theatre, works a treat. 
With its eerie mix of faux religion and military rehearsal, it acts out a notional exchange in 
which the colossal loss of life that occurred during the Gallipoli campaign (and the wider 
cataclysms of World Wars I and II) is exchanged for the perceived benefits of nationhood and 
the masculinist values that underwrite it: courage, duty, endurance, honour, mateship, self-
sacrifice. 
 Congenital to this process of constructing settler nation-states as a collective and 
progressive good is the savage/civilised binary opposition that establishes the settler story as 
hegemonic and the settler as the civiliser of the savage. It also underwrites settler ideology and 
acts as settlerism’s mythopoeic trope. As a result, settler violence is valorised as epic, sacred 
and rules-based while indigenous violence is demonised as hypersavage, barely human and 
irrational. This is apparent in New Zealand’s early settler literature as well as its contemporary 
settler historiography. For example, when James Belich, after demographer Ian Pool, realised 
that an 80,000 fatalities figure for the Musket Wars, inter-iwi battles fought from the early 
1800s to the 1830s, “would have left few Maori alive,” he pulled that figure back to Arthur 
Thomson’s original 20,000, but in the process made the following claim: “The Musket Wars 
were the largest conflict ever fought on New Zealand soil. They killed more New Zealanders 
than World War One – perhaps about 20,000.”70 Gavin McLean picked up this alarm bell and 
rang it even harder: “The butcher’s bill for these wars is as hazy as many of the events, but 
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even if scholars now discount an earlier estimate of 80,000 deaths from fighting or disease, the 
lowest recent guestimate, 20,000 plus, exceeds the New Zealand casualties in either of the two 
world wars; and if measured in terms of casualties per head of population, they were even 
worse.”71 According to McLean: “On a per capita basis that would equate to about 200,000 
deaths in World War I instead of the 18,000 lives actually lost.”72 While space does not permit 
a demonstration of the implausibility of this extrapolation or that when applied in the reverse 
it produces a fatalities figure for the Musket Wars of less than 2,000, it should be noted that it 
has the same effect as Michael King’s labelling the Musket Wars a “‘holocaust’”: it denigrates 
tāngata whenua to the benefit of the settler population.73 As does the version of it published on 
the Ministry for Culture and Heritage’s website New Zealand History Online: “Tens of 
thousands of Māori died in the intertribal Musket Wars of the opening decades of the 19th 
century. On a per capita basis the estimated casualty figures for these wars are equivalent to 
around 200,000 New Zealand deaths in the First World War (in which 18,000 lives were 
actually lost).”74 In comparison with the 200,000, the estimated 3,000 fatalities of the so-called 
New Zealand Wars, wars of dispossession fought mainly between British imperial troops and 
Māori between the 1840s and early 1870s, seem like small change indeed.75 
 Likewise, Peter Hawes, in his review of Ron Crosby’s The Musket Wars, deploys 
hypersignification to much the same effect: 
The Musket Wars is an account of the Maori utu campaigns between about 1807 
and 1840, and depicts a barbarous frenzy of ethnic cleansing on a greater relative 
scale than anything between Tutsi and Hutu or that [which] occurred last century 
in Kosovo. . . . What happened in musket war aftermaths . . . had been unknown in 
Europe since the days of Neanderthal Man: kai tangata. “[They] were to eat on the 
remains until the stench of putrefaction drove them away.” There are about five 
such cannibal feasts to a chapter, involving a menu of thousands. . . . It’s a salutary 
read. Unfortunately, it must be read, for the effects of those dreadful times are, as 
Mr Crosby proves, with us today, and will be here again tomorrow.76 
 
 That is, by denigrating indigenous violence while valorising settler violence, the 
settler society is able to retroactively legitimate its tenuous moral and legal claim to the 
expropriated geography it now controls by promoting the positive values it has attached to the 
heroic and epic deeds of its progenitors. Thus, what is on display every Anzac Day is not so 
much a collective mourning as an economy of desire expressed in quasi-religious terms backed 
by the power of the state. In this “civil religion,” or “cult” as Belich has it, which supplants but 
not entirely replaces the de facto state religion, Anglicanism, the proper names “Australia” and 
“New Zealand” substitute for the Supreme Being, “God.”77 Sian Elias’s oral history substitutes 
for the Gospel reading as does John Key’s address for the sermon, both of which tell of past 
heroic actions and articulate a creed based on the values believed to be inherent in those deeds. 
Dedicated spaces, such as the altar in the World War I Sanctuary at the Auckland War Memorial 
Museum and the Hall of Memories that serves as the commemorative chapel of the National 
War Memorial in Wellington, substitute for the sacred space of churches. Golgotha, the Biblical 
site of crucifixion, becomes, for New Zealanders, Chunuk Bair, the elevated site of death. The 
Bible’s Good Samaritan is, for New Zealanders, the medic Richard Henderson and his donkey 
Roly, and for Australians, Simpson and his donkey Murphy.78 Christ, who died “for everyone,” 
becomes the Unknown Warrior who “represents all New Zealanders who were never to return 
from war,” and “the life everlasting,” from the Apostles’ Creed, becomes “Lest we forget,” 
Anzac Day’s appeal for collective rememoration, which in turn facilitates the “secular 
transformation of fatality into continuity.”79 
 Fittingly, it was the Governor-General, Silvia Cartwright, as representative of New 
Zealand’s Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II, who delivered the eulogy at the interment 
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ceremony of the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in 2004, and, in the process, confirmed that 
this discourse of the dead is a safe one indeed. For while Cartwright subsequently wonders in 
her eulogy who this soldier might be, in the following extract she conjures up a sense of 
certainty about him that seems impolitic to question, not least because his memory has been 
installed “as remembrance within the sacred”: 
He died wearing a New Zealand uniform, and shared with those he had left on the 
other side of the world his belief that the lives of many might be better, by risking 
his own. His was the hope that when the days, the years, of fighting were done, and 
the troop ships sailed south, he would return to what mattered most. To be with the 
people he came from. To live again with the coasts of his own country around him, 
among the hills he knew as a boy, in the streets where he had grown up. These are 
the simple things he left and gave his life for. And now we have brought him 
home.80 
 
 Although much contested during its early development, “Gallipoli” is now a sign that 
functions synecdochally: it stands for all our war dead; it stands for us. In this theatre of desire 
there is no excluded middle: you are either a believer or you are not, either for us or against us, 
either an apostle or an apostate. With an extensive record of photographs, official despatches, 
personal letters and journals “to signify that the event represented has really taken place,” it 
not only meets the criteria for being a proper object of historical study, it also satisfies 
modernity’s taste for the verisimilar and for sacralized relics of war.81 
 
February 6, New Zealand Day or Waitangi Day, the day in 1840 when the British Crown and 
Māori first signed te Tiriti o Waitangi, the te reo version of The Treaty of Waitangi, provides 
an arresting counterpoint to Anzac Day. For while Waitangi Day “is recognised as New 
Zealand’s national day,” it is still too heavily contested to comfortably fulfil that role.82 It is a 
day when Pākehā are too readily reminded of the “long history of place,” as Stephen Turner 
describes it, that precedes their “conquest by contract,” migratory invasion and war by which 
their progenitors converted their status as guests or visitors (manuhiri) to that of owners and 
governors.83 That is why, concluded and largely uncontested, Anzac Day, unlike Waitangi Day, 
provides an annual occasion during which those ignoble values characteristic of European 
settler societies can be overwritten by noble ones. Thus sense trumps senselessness, and Anzac 
Day becomes the de facto national day. Furthermore, Waitangi Day as a national day is 
problematic for Pākehā in that they have already realised the benefit in this notional exchange 
of savagery for civilisation, of tribalism for nationhood: economic and political control of the 
expropriated geography. 
 Similar comments may be made about the official national day in Australia, Australia 
Day, January 26, that marks the arrival in Sydney Harbour in 1788 of the First Fleet of eleven 
British convict ships. As with Māori on Waitangi Day, Australia Day sees significant protests 
from Aboriginal people (First Australians) and their supporters, most notably the “Invasion 
Day” protests begun in 1988. This should not surprise. By treating Australia “as terra nullius—
land owned by no one, and therefore available for the taking”—a notion based on the concept 
of res nullius or nobody’s property, Britain “vested ownership of the entire continent in” its 
“government,” despite it being inhabited shore to shore by a population estimated at “300,000” 
belonging to “more than 250 tribes, each with their own language, laws and territorial 
boundaries” that had lived there for at least 40,000 years or 1200 human generations.84 But 
such is the utility of this legal doctrine, according as it does with settler Australia’s belief in 
itself and its progressive destiny, that Australia’s current Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, an 
author and former Rhodes Scholar, could claim that Australia was “unsettled or scarcely 
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settled” before the First Fleet’s arrival, despite terra nullius having been overturned by the 
High Court of Australia in 1992.85 
 We should not be surprised, then, that New Zealand’s principal “actors” on Anzac Day 
2009 failed to mention that the imperial violence used against the Turks in 1915 had been used 
against Māori some fifty years earlier in the New Zealand Wars. Likewise, Charles Bean, in 
his claim of “126 peaceful years” of existence in Australia prior to World War I, elides from 
his narrative the purportedly numerous First Australian frontier deaths at the hands of settlers.86 
We might also take it that Kevin Rudd’s description of his fellow Australians as wanting “for 
the good of others” did not apply to the Turks during the Gallipoli invasion, nor that it has any 
real compensatory application for Aborigines today despite his apology on 13 February 2008 
for the Stolen Generations (Aboriginal children taken from their families between 1910 and 
1970), an apology, despite its plea for reconciliation, still firmly imbedded in the progressive 
narrative of Australia and predicated on, as Rudd put it, “a core value of our nation—and that 
value is a fair go for all.”87 
 These often highly conflicted truth-claims are all part and parcel of the legitimising 
grand narratives deployed by settler societies, the teleologies of which are always already 
oriented towards the realisation of their civilising projects and the fulfilment of their idealised 
selves in “the not-yet-now.”88 These narratives are not only self-authorising but are also able 
to negate competing indigenous narratives by dint of presenting themselves as superior by 
virtue of the progress they denote. However, just as “the not-yet-now” cannot arrive and still 
be the future, so the goals of these narratives cannot be realized and still remain the focus of 
the collective progress to come.89 It is for these reasons that these goals are kept alive in the 
future anterior of their narratives and regularly updated.90 In the case of Australia and New 
Zealand, as this article has tried to show, an important part of that process is the annual re-
staging of the quasi-religious spectacle of Anzac Day with its sacralization of the noble values 
“discovered” in the carnage of Gallipoli and elevated in the national consciousness to the point 
where they effectively occlude, on the one hand, “the criminality of the act of foundation of 
what became known as ‘Australia,’” and, on the other, the brutality and betrayal by which an 
archipelago, called New Zealand by Europeans, was also taken over by the British.91 While 
this combined expropriation of around eight million square kilometres might seem of 
staggering proportions, it pales into insignificance, or so the Anzac legend would have us 
believe, compared with fighting and dying for freedom and saving civilisation itself. Such is 
the thin but glistening thread of exculpatory memory to which Australasian settlerism clings. 
 
Lest we remember/“Lest we forget”.92 
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